Paying for Risky Behavior

When politicos talk health insurance, it seems that the 500-lb gorilla in the room is cost containment.  Even if we were to create a universal system, how can we ensure the best value for Americans when health insurance providers have a perverse incentive to provide the least amount of care possible in order to bring costs down? 

In "Not-their-fault insurers" (LA Times, 2/24/08), Ezra Klein outlines five principles for a health insurance market: 1) Universality, 2) An End to Cherry-Picking, 3) Risk Adjustment, 4) Benefit Floors and 5) Information Transparency.  I must admit that I find many of his points compelling, including the idea of creating a risk pool so that companies with fewer sick clients subsidize those with more.  But, I disagree with Klein about putting an end to actuarial statistics in health care provision, since it could very well be the key to preventative medicine.  

Equal access to health care does not necessitate equal pricing.  It seems like there should be some market incentives to reward those who actively participate in preventative health routines versus those that develop chronic illnesses because of poor health habits.  We accept such market incentives in the auto insurance market, so why not health care?